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CIVIL PROCEDURE: RUMINATIONS ON SOME
PARAMETERS OF PRACTICE
STEVEN F. MOLO*
Each year the Seventh Circuit decides a great many cases involv-
ing issues of federal civil procedure. The court's 1982-83 term was no
exception. This article discusses some of the more important proce-
dural cases decided during that term. The cases included in the article
were selected because they either resolve novel questions; or signifi-
cantly extend or depart from established precedent. The article reviews
cases involving the following issues: personal jurisdiction; removal;
class actions; reconsideration of judgment orders; appellate review; and
attorneys' fees.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Personal jurisdiction is the court's power to render a judgment
against a person.' That power is limited by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment. 2 Due process requires that a defendant re-
ceive adequate notice of the suit3 and maintain sufficient minimal con-
tacts with the forum so that rendering a judgment against him would
not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.4 A
judgment rendered in violation of due process is void and not entitled
to full faith and credit elsewhere. 5
In recent years courts have been more apt to find the existence of
sufficient minimal contacts through the remote business activity of a
non-resident defendant. 6 The focus throughout this trend has been on
* Mr. Molo is an Assistant Attorney General for the State of Illinois. He focuses on the
areas of trial and appellate practice. Mr. Molo received his B.S. in 1979 and his J.D. in 1982 from
the University of Illinois at Urbana. The views expressed in this article are those of Mr. Molo,
and not those of the Attorney General's Office.
1. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
2. Kulko v. California Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 93 (1978).
3. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
4. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
5. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 729-33 (1878).
6. The Supreme Court discussed the social and economic factors underlying this trend in
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). See also McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). Prime among those factors are the increasing nationali-
zation of commerce, communication, and transportation over the last seventy-five years.
Although inroads in those areas throughout this century have made the United States a much
smaller country, courts must still consider whether it is reasonable to require a defendant to de-
fend a particular suit in a particular forum. The reasonableness of requiring the defendant to
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the reasonableness of requiring a defendant to defend the lawsuit in a
particular forum. However, in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son,7 the Supreme Court indicated that the concept of territorial limita-
tions on a forum's power is still very much alive.8 Thus, courts must
still consider the effect of the due process clause as an instrument of
interstate federalism in determining questions of personal jurisdiction.
Two decisions rendered by the Seventh Circuit this term explore this
delicate balance imposed by due process.
In Froning & Deppe, Inc. v. Continental Illinois National Bank &
Trust Co.,9 the court held that due process would be violated by the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant with de
minimus business contacts with the forum. The case arose from the
forged and unauthorized endorsement of six checks drawn upon an ac-
count at Continental Illinois Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago. The
payee designated on the checks was Froning & Deppe, an Iowa corpo-
ration with its principal place of business in Iowa. The forger cashed
the checks at South Story Bank & Trust in Slater, Iowa. South Story
then remitted the checks for collection and credit to its clearinghouse
bank, Valley National Bank of Des Moines, Iowa. Valley National
then remitted the checks to Continental for collection and credit.' 0
Froning & Deppe, the payee, initially filed suit against South Story
and Continental in Iowa state court. Continental was dismissed from
the Iowa suit pursuant to the national bank exclusive venue provision
of 12 U.S.C. § 94, but South Story remained a party. Froning & Deppe
then sued Continental in federal district court in Chicago. Continental
impleaded Valley National, alleging breach of warranty of good title
under Illinois law. Valley National thereafter named South Story as a
third-party defendant alleging breach of warranty of good title and
conversion under Iowa law. South Story was served at its Iowa offices
defend in the forum must be balanced against: (1) the interest in the forum in adjudicating the
suit; (2) the plaintiff's and the interstate judicial system's interest in expediting the litigation; and
(3) the forum's interest in advancing underlying substantive policies. See Comment, World Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, A Limit to the Expansion of Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 611
(1981). See also Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Juris-
diction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 569 (1958).
7. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
8. The Court noted that "[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State [or, for purposes of this article, a
federal court exercising the powers granted to a State court by State law]; even if the forum State
has a strong interest in applying its law to the controversy; even if the forum state is the most
convenient location for litigation; the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate
federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment." Id at
294.
9. 695 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1982).
10. Id at 290.
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pursuant to the Illinois long-arm statute. South Story entered a limited
appearance to contest personal jurisdiction and moved to dismiss Val-
ley National's third-party complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. I
The extent of South Story's contacts with the forum were undis-
puted. It maintained its only offices in Iowa and had no agents in Illi-
nois. None of its officers had travelled to Illinois to transact business
within five years prior to the lawsuit. Further, all of South Story's ac-
tivities in connection with the transaction at issue took place in Iowa.
It dealt solely with Valley National and had no contact with
Continental. 
1 2
Valley National advanced two arguments in favor of exercising
personal jurisdiction over South Story in the federal district court in
Chicago. First, Valley National contended that South Story knew that
the final destination of the checks was Continental in Illinois. There-
fore, South Story should have reasonably anticipated being haled into
court in Illinois.' 3 Second, Valley National argued that any possible
claim South Story might have had against Continental as a result of the
transaction would have had to have been filed in Illinois and would
have relied upon Illinois law. Thus, South Story availed itself of the
benefits and protections of Illinois law.'
4
The Seventh Circuit rejected Valley National's foreseeability argu-
ment, reasoning that South Story engaged in no conscious or systematic
attempt to render services in Illinois, and there was no evidence that
South Story regularly processed checks drawn on Continental ac-
counts. 15 Accordingly, the court held South Story could not reasonably
foresee being haled into court in Illinois.'6
The court also rejected the argument that South Story availed it-
self of the benefits of Illinois law, reasoning that the existence of such a
hypothetical possibility of an Illinois lawsuit against Continental by
South Story was irrelevant to South Story's vulnerability to Valley Na-
tional's lawsuit in Illinois. 17 The court noted that "[tihe logical result of
Valley National's position would be to hold South Story amenable to
suit in any state in which Continental did business, since the benefits
and protections of that State's courts and law would be available to
11. Id at 290-9 1.
12. Id at 291.
13. Id
14. Id.
15. Id at 292.
16. Id at 293.
17. Id
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South Story in a suit founded on a check transaction."' 8
Finally, the court considered the balance of state and federal inter-
ests and concluded that due process precluded personal jurisdiction. In
weighing Iowa's interest in maintaining jurisdiction, the court noted
that all the acts giving rise to the lawsuit occurred in Iowa. It stated
that the Iowa courts would be more skilled in interpreting the control-
ling Iowa law and that there was no showing that pursuing the claim in
Iowa, along with the Froning & Deppe claim against South Story,
would be any less expedient.' 9
In considering the federal interests at issue, the court emphasized
that maintenance of personal jurisdiction over South Story would hin-
der the free flow of commerce and interstate banking.20 The court rea-
soned that upholding jurisdiction might subject anyone who did
business with a large corporation to suit in any state in which the cor-
poration did business, irrespective of the individual's contacts with the
state. Further, it reasoned that a bank could be subject to suit in any
state from which a check cashed by one of its customers could origi-
nate. The court stated that this "chilling effect" on interstate commerce
weighed heavily against finding jurisdiction.2' Accordingly, the court
held that the imposition of personal jurisdiction on South Story would
violate due process.
The court reached a different result in In re Oil Spill By The
Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978.22 The case
arose out of the litigation concerning the well known oil spill off the
French coast. The spill was caused by the break up of the supertanker
Amoco Cadiz which was built in Spain by a Spanish company, Astil-
leros Espanoles, S.A. French citizens who alleged damages caused by
the spill, sued Amoco (the owner) for negligent operation of the tanker.
In addition, the French plaintiffs sued Astilleros for negligent design of
the ship and breach of implied warranty. Amoco filed a cross-claim
against Astilleros under FRCP 13(g) 23 and a third-party complaint
18. Id In reaching its conclusion on this point the court relied on its earlier decision in Lake-
side Bridge & Steel Co. v. Mountain State Construction Co., 597 F.2d 596 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 907 (1980), which considered the issue and reached a similar result.
19. 695 F.2d at 294.
20. Id
21. Id at 294-95.
22. 699 F.2d 909 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 104 S. Ct. 196 (1983).
23. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(g) provides:
Cross-Claim Against Co-Party. A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one
party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any prop-
erty that is the subject matter of the original action. Such cross-claim may include a
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under FRCP 14(c), 24 alleging that Astilleros was primarily responsible
for the accident and thus, should be required to indemnify Amoco for
any damages it might be ordered to pay.
25
Astilleros' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction was
denied by the district court.26 Astilleros defaulted and the court en-
tered judgment against Astilleros, and in favor of both Amoco and the
French plaintiffs.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss.
In doing so, the court first looked to whether the cause of action in the
cross-claim arose from Astilleros transacting business in Illinois, and
whether application of the Illinois long-arm statute would be consistent
with due process. The court noted that the contract to build the Amoco
Cadiz was anchored in Chicago, as it was negotiated there. It reasoned
that the third-party claims essentially arose from that contract, there-
fore the requirements of the Illinois long-arm act were satisfied.27 Thus,
due process was not offended by requiring Astilleros to defend against
Amoco in Chicago, because Astilleros voluntarily undertook the nego-
tiation and signing of the contract in Chicago and had the protection of
Illinois laws in doing so. Accordingly, the court determined it was rea-
sonable to require Astilleros to defend against Amoco in Chicago.
28
The court concluded that Astilleros exhibited sufficient presence in Illi-
nois to satisfy the territorial notions emphasized in World- Wide
Volkswagen.
29
The court then considered whether the district court maintained
personal jurisdiction over the French plaintiffs' suit against Astilleros.
It first noted that the claim was not quasi-contractual, and was not be-
ing prosecuted in either the place of the wrong or the domicile of one of
claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant
for all or part of a claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
24. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c) provides:
Admiralty and Maritime Claims. When a plaintiff asserts an admiralty or maritime
claim within the meaning of Rule 9(h), the defendant or claimant, as a third-party plain-
tiff, may bring in a third-party defendant who may be wholly or partly liable, either to
the plaintiff or to the third-party plaintiff, by way of remedy over, contribution, or other-
wise on account of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences. In such a case the third-party plaintiff may also demand judgment against the
third-party defendant in favor of the plaintiff, in which event the third-party defendant
shall make his defenses to the claim of the plaintiff as well as to that of the third-party
plaintiff in the manner provided in Rule 12 and the action shall proceed as if the plaintiff
had commenced it against the third-party defendant as well as the third-party plaintiff.
25. 699 F.2d at 912.
26. 491 F. Supp. 170, 178 (N.D. I11. 1979).
27. 699 F.2d at 914-15.
28. Id at 916.
29. Id
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the parties.30 Accordingly, the relationship between the French plain-
tiffs' claim against Astilleros and Illinois was not as close as the rela-
tionship between Amoco's claim against Astilleros and Illinois.
Nevertheless, the court concluded that personal jurisdiction existed.3'
The court held that the French plaintiffs' claim could be viewed as
arising from the transaction of business between Amoco and Astil-
leros.32 Although the plaintiffs were outside the chain of title from As-
tilleros, they were still alleging damage which ultimately resulted from
the contract and negotiation. The plaintiffs, "were not harmed just by
the defective condition of the ship; they were harmed by Amoco's oper-
ation of the ship in its defective condition, and the negotiation and
signing of the contract were critical steps in the chain of events that led
to the oil spill."
33
The court held that the exercise of personal jurisdiction complied
with due process because if negotiating and signing the contract in Illi-
nois subjected Astilleros to Illinois' territorially limited sovereignty for
purposes of the cross-claim, they similarly subjected it to Illinois' sover-
eignty for purposes of the complaint.34 The court reasoned that the
plaintiffs were harmed by Amoco's operation of the ship in its defective
condition. The negotiation and signing of the contract were critical
steps in the chain of events which brought about the oil spill because
that created the sale of the defective ship. Thus, the spill and its result-
ing damage could be viewed as arising in Illinois as a result of the
transaction of business between Amoco and Astilleros in Chicago.35
Further, the court concluded that the interests of judicial economy
were best served by litigating the French plaintiffs' suit in Chicago,
given that Chicago was a reasonable site for all of the other claims. 36
Accordingly, the court held that the district court maintained personal
jurisdiction, and affirmed the entry of the defaults.
Both of these decisions indicate that in deciding personal jurisdic-
tion questions, the Seventh Circuit will continue to consider traditional
territorial limitations on sovereignty, as well as the reasonableness of a
30. Id at 917.
31. Judge Posner, in a style unmistakably his own, set forth the dilemma stating: "[biut if it
seems odd for the French to be suing the Spanish in a court in Chicago because of an oil spill off
the French coast, it would also be odd if, though the French can sue Amoco in Chicago and








particular forum. This result seems to be a consistent and logical appli-
cation of World- Wide Volkswagen. However, the result demonstrates
the continued problem of personal jurisdiction questions-how much is
enough? Until the Supreme Court sets forth more specific guidelines,
courts will be forced to continue this case-by-case balancing. The Sev-
enth Circuit's analysis in these two cases provides a sound example of
the proper considerations involved in that balancing.
REMOVAL
In general, a party being sued in State court in an action which
originally could have been brought in federal court, may remove the
suit to federal court.37 The federal courts, however, tend to strictly con-
strue the statutes allowing removal, and thereby limit removal jurisdic-
tion.38 Last term, the Seventh Circuit decided several cases which
discuss issues concerning removal jurisdiction.
In Illinois v. Kerr-McGee39 the court reaffirmed its view that fed-
eral preemption is merely a defense to state law claims, and not a
proper basis for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441.40 The case arose
from a lawsuit which was filed in DuPage County Circuit Court. The
suit alleged that Kerr-McGee's operation and maintenance of a plant
which produced compounds derived from radioactive ore, violated var-
37. The general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1982) states:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of
the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded
on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States
shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any
other such action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly
joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would
be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable
claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may
determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction.
(d) Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign state as defined in
section 1603(a) of this title may be removed by the foreign state to the district court of
the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending. Upon removal the action shall be tried by the court without jury. Where re-
moval is based upon this subsection, the time limitations of section 1446(b) of this chap-
ter may be enlarged at any time for cause shown.
For a thorough discussion of the nuances of removal jurisdiction, see C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 148-68 (3d ed. 1976).
38. See 14 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDIC-
TION § 3721 nn. 78-82 (1976).
39. 677 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1982).
40. See supra note 37.
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ious provisions of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act and other
state hazardous waste laws. The plant was located on forty-three acres
within the city boundaries of West Chicago. The City of West Chicago
filed suit in the same court, alleging maintenance of a public nuisance
and violation of state and city regulations.
Kerr-McGee petitioned to remove both suits to federal court, con-
tending that both cases raised a federal question and that diversity ex-
isted in the West Chicago case. The State moved to remand,4' arguing
that its complaint raised no federal question. West Chicago acquiesced
to the removal.
The district court denied the State's motion for remand, reasoning
that the Atomic Energy Act preempted state regulation of radioactive
waste and thus, the complaint necessarily involved interpretation of
federal law. Kerr-McGee then moved to dismiss both complaints and
the district court granted the motions, finding that federal law con-
ferred exclusive jurisdiction over regulation of radiation hazards upon
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
42
The Seventh Circuit held that the State suit was improperly re-
moved.43 The court began by reciting the general rule that a defendant
may remove a case to federal court only if the federal court would have
had original jurisdiction over the action had it been brought there ini-
tially.44 The existence of a federal question must appear on the face of
the complaint. 45  A defendant's assertion that a case raises a federal
question is not enough to support removal unless the federal question is
an essential element of the complaint justifying the relief sought.46 Re-
moval jurisdiction is derivative in that a case may be removed to fed-
eral court only if it was properly before the state court.47  Courts
41. The procedure for remand is set forth in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1447(c) and (d) (1982) which state:
(c) If at any time before final judgment it appears that the case was removed im-
providently and without jurisdiction, the district court shall remand the case, and may
order the payment of just costs. A certified copy of the order of remand shall be mailed
by its clerk to the clerk of the State court. The State court may thereupon proceed with
such case.
(d) An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not
reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order remanding a case to the State
court from which it was removed pursuant to § 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by
appeal or otherwise.
42. 677 F.2d at 574.
43. Id at 577.
44. See Arkansas v. Kansas & Texas Coal Co., 183 U.S. 185, 189 (1901).
45. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, 415 U.S. 125, 127 (1974); Nuclear Engineering Co.
v. Scott, 660 F.2d 241, 249 (7th Cir. 1981).
46. See Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112 (1936); Jones v. General Tire &
Rubber Co., 541 F.2d 660, 664 (7th Cir. 1976).
47. See Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922);
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consistently construe the removal statute narrowly against removal.48
The court considered these tenets of removal and looked directly
to the State's complaint. The court found that the complaint alleged
violations of State law only, and that these violations rather than unal-
leged federal violations, served as the basis of the complaint and relief
sought.49 Accordingly, the court held that the complaint raised no fed-
eral question justifying removal.50 Further, the court held that Kerr-
McGee's allegations of preemption merely set forth a defense to the
state claims and could not serve as a basis for preemption.5' This con-
clusion comports with the Seventh Circuit's earlier decision in Bailey v.
Logan Square Typographers52 and the decisions of two other circuits
that had considered the question.5 3 Because the court held that the
State suit was improperly removed, it found no reason to consider the
question of preemption of the State's claim.
54
A second removal case of note was Ross v. Inter-Ocean Insurance
Company.5 5 This case involved a suit by an insured against his out-of-
state insurance company, alleging that it failed to provide him coverage
under his policy. The plaintiff filed suit in state court. The defendant
removed the case on diversity grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, and
later moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the mo-
Washington v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 658 (9th Cir.
1972).
48. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108 (1941). See also C. WRIGHT,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 154 (3d ed. 1976).
49. 677 F.2d at 576-77.
50. Id at 577.
5 1. The court reiterated this view in People of the State of Illinois v. General Electric Com-
pany, 683 F.2d 206, 208 (7th Cir. 1982). The General Electric case provides an interesting discus-
sion of the case or controversy requirement in declaratory judgment actions challenging the
constitutionality of state laws prior to actual enforcement. See 683 F.2d at 209-12.
52. 441 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1971).
53. See First National Bank of Aberdeen v. Aberdeen National Bank, 627 F.2d 843, 853 (8th
Cir. 1980); Washington v. American League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 460 F.2d 654, 660
(9th Cir. 1972).
54. The court, however, did discuss federal preemption of West Chicago's claim. Federal
preemption of state police powers occurs only where Congress evinces a clear and mainfest intent
to preempt. Courts generally find such an intent evinced in one of three ways. First, Congress
may expressly state that federal authority over a particular subject is exclusive. Second, a court
may infer an intent to preempt from a particular regulatory scheme or the legislative history.
Finally, federal law preempts state law where it is impossible to comply with both. See Northern
States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143, 1146-47 (8th Cir. 1971), agf'a 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
The Seventh Circuit reviewed the Atomic Energy Act and its legislative history and deter-
mined that the Act allows states to regulate non-radiation hazards, but preempts state law con-
cerning radiation hazards unless the state enters a statutorily authorized agreement to assume
some responsibility for that regulation. The court then reviewed the record and found that on the
basis of the complaint it was not clear whether the sites complained of involved non-radiation
hazards. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for further proceedings. 677 F.2d at 584.
55. 693 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1982).
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tion and dismissed the complaint.5 6
The Seventh Circuit held that the case was improperly removed to
the district court. The court noted that although neither party ques-
tioned subject matter jurisdiction, it maintained a responsibility to de-
termine jurisdiction independently in every case. Upon its own
motion, the court concluded that the amount in controversy did not
exceed $10,000 and therefore, held that it lacked subject matter juris-
diction over the case.
57
The ad damenum sought $16,454 exclusive of interest and costs.
The court, however, looked beyond the ad damenum. It noted that the
complaint alleged that the plaintiff submitted proof of loss to the de-
fendant before filing suit. The plaintiffs pretrial statement, filed five
months after the complaint, stated that medical expenses totalled
$9,003. In the pretrial order, filed six weeks after the pretrial statement,
the parties stipulated that the amount of the plaintiffs damages totalled
$7,644. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's submission of proof to
the defendant prior to filing the complaint suggested the damages could
have been no more than the claimed $9,000. Further, the court rea-
soned that the stipulated pretrial order indicated that the defendant
possessed undisputed proof that the damages totalled less than
$9,000.58
The complaint also sought attorney's fees. Plaintiff's counsel con-
tended that the $16,454 figure represented the addition of his estimated
fee to the medical expenses. The court, however, found no statutory,
contractual or other source supporting a fee claim. 59
Thus, the court held that the case failed to meet the minimum
$10,000 jurisdictional amount. The court concluded, "that when it re-
moved this case the defendant knew with about as close an approach to
certainty as one finds in these matters that the plaintiff could not prove
damages, including attorney's fees, in excess of $10,000 as required by
the diversity statute." 60 The court noted that a defendant's reliance on
an ad damenum is not enough, particularly in cases such as this where
the defendant was familiar with the basis for the claim.6'
Ross points out the harshness of the potential result to a defendant
who improperly removes a case. The district court dismissed the case
with prejudice against the plaintiff. Because the Seventh Circuit re-
56. Id at 660.
57. Id at 660-6 I.
58. Id at 661.
59. Id
60. Id at 662.
61. Id
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versed and ordered remand of the case, the plaintiff could start all over
again in state court. The severity of that result should caution other
litigants against taking a chance on removing a case when subject mat-
ter jurisdiction is questionable. The case also reinforces the position
taken by the federal courts that the jurisdictional amount will be
strictly construed.
62
These cases indicate that the federal courts will continue to strictly
construe removal jurisdiction and insist that all requirements of subject
matter jurisdiction be met.
CLASS ACTION
The Seventh Circuit decided two class action cases of note. Woods
v. New York Life Insurance CompanyA3 involved the proper form of
notice to potential plaintiffs in class actions filed under section 16(b) of
the Fair Labor Standards Act. 64 Although Woods concerned notice to
a class created pursuant to a specific statutory cause of action rather
than a class certified pursuant to FRCP 23, the case merits review in
light of the recent increase in age discrimination suits brought under
the Act.
The case involved the firing of one of 300 general managers of
New York Life. The plaintiff alleged that as he approached age 55, an
age at which his retirement benefits would have increased significantly,
his employers harrassed him, demoted him and eventually fired him.
65
The plaintiff then wrote a book designed to expose the alleged unfair
employment policies of New York Life. In an effort to advertise the
book, the plaintiff sent mailers to a number of other former general
managers inviting them to buy the book. The mailers also suggested
that the managers join in a class action suit against New York Life.66
The plaintiff eventually filed suit along with one other former manager.
The plaintiff asked the district court to mail notice to the prospec-
tive members of the class-general managers of New York Life sub-
jected to the alleged discriminatory practices. The district court agreed
to send a notice drafted by the plaintiff's counsel.67 In substance, the
62. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). See also D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTs 513-38
(2d ed. 1975).
63. 686 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1982).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), incorporated in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act by § 7(b)
of that Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
65. 686 F.2d at 579.
66. The plaintiff had not yet filed suit at the time he wrote the book and sent the mailers.
The mailers invited the other former managers "to get in touch with [plaintiff] regarding this
suit." Id.
67. Id
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notice summarized the relevant portions of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act and the complaint. Further, it instructed the recipi-
ent on how to join the suit, warned of the possible expiration of the
statute of limitations, and offered the option of retaining the plaintiff's
counsel. The notice was sent on the letterhead of the district court over
the Clerk's signature, and stated that the court approved the mailing.68
The defendant challenged the district court's authority to issue such a
notice in a § 16(b) class action.
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by noting that if the suit
was a class action under FRCP 23, the district court clearly would be
empowered and bound to notify actual or potential members of the
class. A Rule 23 class action binds all members of the class that do not
expressly opt out of the suit.69 In contrast, a section 16(b) suit does not
bind a class member unless he expressly consents in writing to become
a party.
70
New York Life argued that the district court lacked the power to
issue the plaintiff's notice because § 16(b) does not expressly authorize
such notice, and no authorization can be inferred because a § 16(b) suit
does not place unnotified class members in the same perilous position
as unnotified class members in Rule 23 class actions. In other cases the
Ninth Circuit accepted such an argument,71 while the Second Circuit
rejected it.72
The Seventh Circuit took a middle course. It held that the district
court enjoyed the power to provide notice to potential class members.
However, the court stated that it was "improper for the district court to
direct that the notice go out on its letterhead, over the signature of the
clerk of court or other judicial officer."'
73
The court looked to the language of § 16(b). It noted that the Act
explicitly authorizes a representative action. Accordingly, the cause of
action must carry with it a right of the representative plaintiff to notify
other potential class members of the suit.74 Further, "[i]t also follows
that counsel for the representative plaintiff could seek from the district
court an order approving the notice, to protect himself from being ac-
cused of stirring up litigation in violation of state law."' 75 Moreover,
68. Id
69. Accordingly, serious due process problems would arise if the district court did not at-
tempt to notify all class members of the suit. Id
70. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
71. Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859, 863 (9th Cir. 1977).
72. Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., 600 F.2d 335, 336 (2d Cir. 1978).
73. 686 F.2d at 581.
74. Id at 580.
75. Id The court cited Wisconsin Supreme Court Rule 11.01 as an example.
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the court held that plaintiffs counsel is entitled to an order requiring
the defendant to furnish the names and addresses of potential class
members.
The court, however, limited its holding to prevent the district court
from actually issuing the notice. It reasoned that a notice sent on the
court's letterhead over the Clerk's signature, "is likely to be misunder-
stood as a representation that the suit probably has merit. ' 76 The court
stated that such action is tantamount to a federal judge issuing invita-
tions to a lawsuit and reasoned that no statutory or policy basis could
justify such communication with nonparties. Accordingly, the court
vacated and remanded the case with instructions to the district court to
authorize issuance of a notice consistent with its opinion.
77
Woods places a logical limitation on the type of class notice a
plaintiff in a 16(b) action may send. The decision ensures that potential
class members receive an objective, informative notice. Thus, it dis-
courages frivolous litigation and its unnecessary consumption of court,
attorney and client time and resources.
Evans v. City of Chicago78 involved a challenge to the district
court's FRCP 23 class certification based on distinctions within a chal-
lenged state statute. The plaintiffs were judgment creditors of the City
of Chicago who challenged both the city's practices in paying judg-
ments and the state statute authorizing the payment practices. The dis-
trict court designated two subclasses based upon the time the party
would receive payment pursuant to the challenged statute. The plain-
tiffs argued that the subclassification could not be based on distinctions
within the challenged statute.
The Seventh Circuit held that the subclasses could be based upon
the challenged statute because each subclass represented differing argu-
ments against the statute. It did not matter that the distinct subclasses
might also advance a common argument alleging the facial unconstitu-
tionality of a statute.79
RELIEF FROM JUDGMENTS
Last term, the Seventh Circuit decided several cases concerning
relief from judgments which merit comment. A party seeking reconsid-
eration or reopening of a court's judgment order bears a heavy burden.
Courts maintain a strong interest in achieving finality in litigation and
76. 686 F.2d at 581.
77. Id at 581-82.
78. 689 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1982).
79. 689 F.2d at 1293.
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must consider the hardship that reopening a judgment may cause to
persons other than the party seeking relief. However, courts generally
will not let procedural technicalities prevent them from remedying an
injustice. For the most part, relief from judgments of the district court
is available under Rules 5980 or 60.81 Four cases decided this term dis-
80. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 states:
New Trials; Amendment of Judgments.
(a) Grounds. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or
part of the issues (1) in an action in which there has been a trial by jury, for any of the
reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts
of the United States; and (2) in an action tried without a jury, for any of the reasons for
which rehearings have heretofore been granted in suits in equity in the courts of the
United States. On a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the
entry of a new judgment.
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10
days after the entry of the judgment.
(c) Time for Serving Affidavits. When a motion for new trial is based upon affida-
vits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such
service within which to serve opposing affidavits, which period may be extended for an
additional period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) On Initiative of Court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the
court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have
granted a new trial on motion of a party. After giving the parties notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard on the matter, the court may grant a motion for a new trial, timely
served, for a reason not stated in the motion. In either case, the court shall specify in the
order the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend the judg-
ment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
81. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60 states:
Relief from Judgment or Order.
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the
record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the
court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice,
if any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the
appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered Evidence;
Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (I) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or ex-
trinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is
void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equita-
ble that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justi-
fying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a
reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judg-
ment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b)
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not
limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not actually personally
notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C. § 1655, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon
the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and
bills in the nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any
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cuss the operation and effect of those rules.
In A.D. Weiss Lithograph Company v. Illinois Adhesive Products
Company,82 the Seventh Circuit settled the question of whether to char-
acterize motions for reconsideration as motions pursuant to FRCP
59(e) or FRCP 60(b). The question is important because of the very
different procedural consequences between the two rules.
The case involved the review of the district court's order dis-
missing the complaint upon the defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment.83 Judgment was entered on August 19, 1982. Within ten days of
being served with the judgment order, the plaintiff filed with the district
court a "motion to reconsider summary judgment," purportedly under
Rule 59(e), seeking correction of what plaintiff perceived as errors of
law. On September 17th, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the
summary judgment. On September 24th, the district court dismissed
the motion to reconsider on the basis that the motion in fact was a 60(b)
motion and thus, outside the district court's jurisdiction due to the fil-
ing of the notice of appeal. On October 21 st, the plaintiff filed a second
notice of appeal contesting the district court's dismissal of the motion
to reconsider.
84
FRCP 59(e) provides that a party may move to alter or amend a
judgment within ten days of the entry of the judgment. The ten day
limitation under the rule is jurisdictional and cannot be extended. A
motion under Rule 59(e) tolls the thirty day period for filing a notice of
appeal.8
5
FRCP 60(b) provides that a party may seek relief from a judgment
due to: (1) mistake, inadvertance or excusable neglect; (2) newly dis-
covered evidence not known within Rule 59(e)'s ten day time limita-
tion; (3) fraud; (4) voidness; (5) satisfaction, release or discharge; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief.8 6 A party may file a motion under
Rule 60(b) within a reasonable time, but a motion alleging any of the
first three grounds for relief must be made within one year of entry of
the judgment. A motion under Rule 60(b) does not affect the time for
filing a notice of appeal.87
The Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff's motion fell within the
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independ-
ent action.
82. 705 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
83. Id at 249.
84. Id
85. See Dove v. Codesco, 569 F.2d 807, 809 (4th Cir. 1978).
86. See supra note 74.
87. See Western Transport Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 682 F.2d 1233, 1236 (7th
Cir. 1982).
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parameters of Rule 59(e). It noted that although the terms "alter or
amend" imply something less than "set aside," a 59(e) motion may be
used to set aside a judgment in its entirety.88 The court reasoned that
such an interpretation, "minimizes ambiguity for lawyers and judges in
deciding whether a motion challenging judgment is a Rule 59(e) or a
Rule 60(b) motion. '89 Further, the court stated that although the
plaintiff labeled his pleading a "motion to reconsider," a court must
look to the body of the motion rather than relying on its caption to
determine its request. Thus, the court held that a motion asking a dis-
trict court to reconsider its judgment and correct errors of law is a Rule
59(e) motion.90
Accordingly, the court held that the original notice of appeal was
filed by the plaintiff only as protection against the district court finding
that the post-judgment motion was not a Rule 59(e) motion. Thus, it
reversed the district court's order dismissing the motion to reconsider,
and remanded for consideration of the motion under Rule 59(e). 91
In three other cases the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its interpreta-
tion of the general criteria for Rule 60(b) relief from a default judg-
ment. To vacate a default judgment under 60(b), a party must: (1) file
the motion within a reasonable time period; (2) satisfy one of the ap-
propriate grounds for relief under Rule 60(b); and (3) demonstrate a
meritorious defense on the merits.92 These cases emphasize that a
60(b) motion seeks extraordinary relief and that all of the requirements
of the rule must be fully satisfied.
In Planet Corporation v. Sullivan,93 the Seventh Circuit held that
the one-year time limitation for filing a motion which seeks relief under
any of the first three grounds set forth in Rule 60(b) merely specifies the
outer boundary for filing such a motion and is not a grace period dur-
ing which a party may file. 94 The defaulted defendant filed a Rule
60(b) motion six months after the entry of default, alleging that the
plaintiff failed to provide the three days notice of default specified by
88. Id, citing, 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 817 (1973).
The court noted that the majority of courts considering the question have reached the same
conclusion.
89. 705 F.2d at 250.
90. The court, however, cautioned that every post-judgment motion filed within ten days is
not necessarily a Rule 59(e) motion. For limiting considerations see Textile Banking Co. v.
Rentschler, 657 F.2d 844, 848-49 (7th Cir. 1981); Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684
F.2d 1226, 1247-48 (7th Cir. 1982).
91. 705 F.2d at 250.
92. See Breuer v. Electric Mfg. Co. v. Toronado Systems of America, Inc., 687 F.2d 182, 187
(7th Cir. 1982).
93. 702 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1983).
94. Id at 125-26.
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FRCP 55(b)(2). Prior to the entry of default, however, defendant's
counsel appeared before the district court judge on another matter and
at that time the judge warned that a default would be entered for fail-
ure to appear at a scheduled pretrial conference that day. The court
denied the 60(b) motion. One year after the entry of default, the de-
fendant filed a second 60(b) motion reiterating the grounds raised in
the first motion. The district court denied the second motion.95
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the 60(b) motion, find-
ing that the motion was untimely.96 According to the court, the "rea-
sonableness" requirement of 60(b) applies to all grounds for relief and
must be read together with the one year limitation on the first three
grounds. 97 The court stated that what is reasonable depends on the
facts of each case. Accordingly, it held that as the delay in making the
60(b) motion approaches one year, there should be a corresponding in-
crease in the burden of showing that the delay was reasonable. 98
In United States v. Forty-Eight Thousand, Five Hundred, Ninety-
Five Dollars,99 the court emphasized that a motion satisfying the first
two requirements of Rule 60(b) relief still will not be granted to vacate
a default if the defendant fails to set forth a valid defense to the merits.
The court, however, stated that the district court must make it clear that
it has reviewed the alleged defense before declining to vacate the
default.
In Forty-Eight Thousand, a forfeiture action was brought as a re-
sult of a Customs' seizure of currency. The seizure resulted from the
currency owner's failure to truthfully answer forms concerning the
amount of money brought into the country. The forfeiture resulted in
the defendant losing his life savings. The defendant failed to appear
and the district court entered a default judgment against him. The de-
fendant filed a 60(b) motion forty-nine weeks after entry of the default.
The district court summarily held that because the defendant lacked a
meritorious defense, it did not need to determine whether the motion
was timely or the result of excusable neglect. 100
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the district court
abused its discretion in failing to fully analyze and discuss the colora-
95. Id at 125.
96. Id at 127.
97. Id at 125-26.
98. Id In reaching its decision the court cited the Second Circuit case adopting this view,
Amoco Overseas Oil Co. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation, 605 F.2d 648, 656
(2d Cit. 1979).
99. 705 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1983).
100. Id at 911-12.
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ble defenses raised by the defendant in his Rule 60(b) motion to reopen
the default.' 0 ' The court found that the circumstances of the case sug-
gested that the motion was timely filed and the result of excusable ne-
glect. It concluded that the defendant might have had a meritorious
defense to the forfeiture.10 2 Accordingly, the court remanded to the
district court for further consideration.
Finally, in Inryco v. Metropolitan Engineering Co.,10 3 the Seventh
Circuit discussed the use of a Rule 59(e) motion to challenge a court's
ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion. Inryco involved an attempt to vacate a
default entered after the defendants' counsel flagrantly violated numer-
ous discovery and status orders and failed to file an answer during the
twenty months after the filing of the complaint.1°4
The defendants learned of the default approximately two months
after its entry. They retained new counsel who promptly appeared and
filed an answer to the complaint, discovery responses, and a motion to
vacate the default. The motion cited both Rules 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(6),
but argued primarily for relief under Rule 60(b)(1). l0 5 They contended
that the default was entered as a result of mistake, inadvertance, sur-
prise or excusable neglect.' 0 6 The district court found that viewing the
record in the light most favorable to defendants, it was still "replete
with inexcusable omissions, deceits and irresponsibilities" on the part
of their lawyer 0 7 and thus, denied the 60(b) motion.
The defendants filed a Rule 59(e) motion arguing that after the
court found defendants' counsel's conduct inexcusably irresponsible, it
should have granted the motion to vacate on the authority of Rule
60(b)(6). Further, defendants maintained that they could not be
charged with their lawyer's conduct. 0 8 The district court denied the
Rule 59(e) motion.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit discussed three primary issues:
(1) whether a party may seek relief under Rule 59(e) after denial of a
Rule 60(b) motion; (2) whether a party may assert the same grounds to
support a Rule 60(b)(6) claim that were urged in support of an earlier
60(b)(1) claim; and (3) whether a lawyer's gross negligence satisfies the
requirements for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 10 9
101. Id at 914.
102. Id at 914-15.
103. 708 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1983).
104. Id at 1227-28.
105. Id at 1232.
106. Id at 1229.
107. Id at 1231.
108. Id
109. Id at 1231-32.
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Because the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion is itself an appealable
judgment order, a party must be given an opportunity to seek alteration
or amendment of that order pursuant to Rule 59(e). Thus, the Seventh
Circuit held that a party can challenge the denial of a Rule 60(b) mo-
tion with a motion to alter or amend under Rule 59(e).1 0 The Rule
59(e) motion, however, may challenge only the judgment on the Rule
60(b) motion and not the validity of the underlying judgment.
The more difficult issue was whether the defendants could use the
same set of circumstances to support claims under both Rules 60(b)(1)
and 60(b)(6). In dicta, the Seventh Circuit has noted that the two rules
are "mutually exclusive so that they both cannot apply to the same
alleged factual situation.""' This exclusivity prevents litigants from
circumventing the one-year time limitation of Rule 60(b)(1) grounds
for relief in a Rule 60(b)(6) motion which might be filed more than a
year after judgment.
In Inryco, the court reasoned that the exclusivity requirement
merely mandates that "Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be the basis for relief
when the facts asserted fall within the purview of one of the other five
subsections of Rule 60(b). Rule 60(b)(6) may apply only if Rule
60(b)(1) does not apply."
' " 2
Accordingly, the district court's denial of the defendants' 60(b)(l)
motion did not automatically constitute denial of the 60(b)(6) claim.
The district court failed to fully discuss Rule 60(b)(6) as a basis for
vacating the default. Thus, the Seventh Circuit held that the defend-
ants properly moved for reconsideration for a determination of
whether the facts alleged justified relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 
1 3
The court next discussed the reasons advanced for the Rule
60(b)(6) relief-the grossly negligent conduct of the defendants' lawyer.
The court discussed whether such conduct could justify relief under
60(b)(6), but expressly reserved the question for another day. It rea-
soned that in this case no ruling on that question was necessary because
the defendants could be charged with the misdeeds of their lawyer due
to their own failure to keep in contact with their lawyer over a two year
period. 114
110. Id at 1232.
111. Ben Sager Chemicals International v. E. Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 810 (7th Cir.
1977), quoting from, Bershad v. McDonough, 469 F.2d 1333, 1336 n.3 (7th Cir. 1972). The Ber-
shad court relied on Transit Casualty Co. v. Security Trust Co., 441 F.2d 788, 792 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971).
112. 708 F.2d at 1233.
113. Id
114. Id at 1234.
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The court expressed its reluctance to impute the misdeeds of a law-
yer to his client, noting that "[d]efault judgments are not meant for
disciplining a member of the bar at the expense of a litigant's day in
court." 1 5 However, the defendants in this case contacted their lawyer
fewer than six times during a twenty month period and thus, could not
escape culpability for the failure to proceed with the case.
The court noted the apparent harshness of the result but reasoned
that the result was, "tempered by the fairly common knowledge that a
viable avenue for relief exists for truly deserving litigants. Just as with
other professionals, a remedy for an attorney's professional negligence
is a suit for malpractice."' 16
These cases indicate that the Seventh Circuit will continue to ap-
prove relief from judgments only in extraordinary circumstances and
where all the requirements for such relief are satisfied. These cases,
however, also demonstrate the court's awareness of the confusing pro-
cedural mechanism for obtaining relief from judgments and the unfair-
ness which may result to the parties due to an uneven or incomplete
application of that mechanism. Relief from judgments lies within the
discretion of the district court. These four cases provide clear guide-
lines for the exercise of that discretion.
APPELLATE REVIEW
The Seventh Circuit decided two significant cases concerning the
scope of appellate jurisdiction. In University Lfe Insurance Company
ofAmerica v. Unimarc Ltd., 17 the court considered the appealability of
an order to arbitrate, issued under the United States Arbitration Act.
The district court issued the arbitration order, but retained jurisdiction
to provide any additional relief that might become appropriate later.
The Seventh Circuit held that such an order is appealable, notwith-
standing the district court's retention of jurisdiction.
The case involved a dispute over a marketing agreement between
two insurance companies. The agreement provided for arbitration of
any disputes arising from the agreement. The defendant refused to
submit to arbitration after a dispute arose. The plaintiff filed a diver-
sity suit to compel arbitration." 8 The district court ordered arbitration
but retained jurisdiction both to resolve any future disputes over arbi-
trability and to enforce any awards which might result from the arbi-
115. Id
116. Id at 1235.
117. 699 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1983).
118. Id at 848.
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tration proceedings. The defendant appealed, and the plaintiff argued
that the Seventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction, contending that the district
court's retention of jurisdiction prevented the order from being final
and appealable.' 19
On appeal, Judge Posner began by analogizing the arbitration or-
der to a mandatory injunction. 20 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), in-
junctions are appealable regardless' of finality. The court
acknowledged that interlocutory orders under the Arbitration Act have
been held not to be mandatory injunctions, on the practical ground that
otherwise § 1292(a)(1) would allow piecemeal appeals, thereby impair-
ing a principal advantage of arbitration--expediency. The court noted
that in other contexts, courts have described such orders in terms of
mandatory injunctions.' 2' It further noted that there was a single claim
in the complaint and therefore, there was no possibility of a piecemeal
appeal of the case. Thus, the court reasoned that retaining jurisdiction
in this case was no different than a court retaining jurisdiction follow-
ing entry of an order issuing a mandatory injunction for purposes of an
appeal under § 1292(a)(1).
122
The court, however, held that regardless of the existence of
§ 1292(a)(1), the district court's order could be deemed a final judg-
ment under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.123 The court noted that the purpose of
requiring a final judgment before appeal is to limit appeals to the time
when they best serve the litigation and the judicial system. Accord-
ingly, an order is ripe for appeal, "as soon as it is apparent that subse-
quent rulings of the trial court are not going to moot the issues that the
appellant would like to present, or raise new issues that the appellate
court could most efficiently decide when reviewing the earlier
ruling."' 24
Applying that test, the court concluded that the arbitration order
was appealable notwithstanding the district court's retention of juris-
diction for purposes of enforcement and possible future arbitrability
questions. The court noted that it was possible that no arbitration
awards would be issued and enforcement might never be sought. Fur-
ther, it reasoned that if the district court ordered arbitration and left it
at that, the parties could still seek adjudication of arbitrability ques-
119. Id
120. Id at 849.
121. The court cited Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 212 (1962); Local 344 Leather
Goods Union v. Singer Co. Piecework Control Systems, 84 F.R.D. 424 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
122. 699 F.2d at 849.
123. Id
124. Id
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tions at a later date. Accordingly, the district court's order was no less
final and appealable than if it had not retained the limited
jurisdiction. 1
25
Another case deciding a significant question of appellate jurisdic-
tion is Freeman v. Chicago Musical Instrument Co. 126 In Freeman the
court held that an order granting a motion to disqualify counsel is a
collateral and appealable order under § 1291, in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord 127 Under the
collateral order doctrine, a party may appeal a nonfinal order if three
criteria are met. First, the order must be a determination of the collat-
eral question in dispute. Second, the order must resolve an issue com-
pletely separate from the merits of the action. Third, the order must be
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
128
Historically, the Seventh Circuit has viewed both orders denying
as well as orders granting motions to disqualify counsel as satisfying
the collateral order doctrine. 129 In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ris-
jord, however, the Supreme Court held that an order denying a motion
to disqualify counsel in a civil case is not appealable under § 1291. The
Court held that such an order fails to satisfy the third requirement of
the collateral order doctrine. It reasoned that if the court of appeals
concluded that the order constituted prejudicial error, it could vacate
the judgment and order a new trial. Further, the Court reasoned that
the harm to the litigant forced to await final judgment before appeal-
ing, did not differ significantly from other interlocutory orders that may
be erroneous, such as motions for reversal of the trial judge or orders
requiring discovery over a work-product objection. 1
30
The Seventh Circuit declined to extend the holding of Firestone to
orders granting a motion for disqualification. The court held that dis-
qualification orders, "have immediate, severe and often irreparable and
unreviewable consequences upon both the individual who hired the
disqualified attorney or law firm as well as upon the disqualified
counsel."131
Judge Coffey set forth three reasons for the court's ruling. First,
the party losing the disqualification dispute is immediately separated
from the counsel of his choice and must select a new legal advisor dur-
125. Id at 849-50.
126. 689 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1982).
127. 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
128. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
129. See Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 709 n.5 (7th Cir. 1976).
130. 449 U.S. at 378.
131. 689 F.2d at 719.
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ing the course of the litigation.' 32 Second, the disqualified counsel
often suffers impairment of reputation and that impairment might
never be corrected on appeal if the party is satisfied with the perform-
ance of new counsel. 33 Third, a major reason for denying collateral
review of the denial of disqualification motions is to prevent parties
from using such an appeal for delay or harrassment.' 34 The decision
conforms with the decisions of other courts that have considered the
issue since Firestone.1
35
Another case which was important for its procedural consequences
was Connecticut General Life Insurance Company v. Chicago Title and
Trust Company.136 In Connecticut General, the court sent a message to
all those practicing before it that the local rules of practice would be
enforced. The case involved a motion for leave to file a brief instanter.
Local rule 8(a) 137 states that motions for extensions of time in
which to file a brief are disfavored and must be filed five days before
132. In contrast, there is no disruption of the litigation upon the denial of a motion for dis-
qualification. Further, the court noted that a party forced to wait to appeal would be saddled with
the almost insurmountable burden of having to prove that he lost the case because of the change
in counsel, Id.
133. Moreover, it is doubtful that disqualified counsel could find an adequate remedy for
wrongful loss of fees if his former client prevails on appeal at the litigation's end. Id at 720.
134. The granting of a disqualification motion indicates that a legitimate, nonfrivolous issue
has been raised. The court reasoned that appellate review of disqualification orders allows courts
to dispose of such a serious matter promptly and thereby facilitate and improve the system of
justice. Id.
135. See, e.g., United States v. Hobson, 672 F.2d 825 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Caggi-
ano, 660 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982); In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings, Etc., 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 990 (1982); Glueck v.
Jonathan Logan, Inc., 653 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1981); Duncan v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 646 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 895 (1981).
136. 701 F.2d 62 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 502 (1983).
137. Rule 8 of THE CIRCUIT RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT (1982) states:
(a) Extensions of Time. Extensions of time to file briefs are not favored. A request
for an extension of time shall be in the form of a motion supported by affidavit. The date
the brief is due shall be stated in the motion. The affidavit must disclose facts which
establish to the satisfaction of the court that with due diligence, and giving priority to the
preparation of the brief, it will not be possible to file the brief on time.
In addition, if the time for filing the brief has been previously extended, the affidavit
shall set forth the filing date of any prior motions and the court's ruling thereon. All
factual statements required by this rule shall be set forth with specificity. Generalities,
such as that the purpose of the motion is not for delay, or that counsel is too busy, will
not be sufficient.
Grounds that may merit consideration are:
(1) Engagement in other litigation, provided such litigation is identified by cap-
tion, number, and court, and there is set forth (a) a description of action taken on a
request for continuance of deferment of other litigation; (b) an explanation of the rea-
sons why other litigation should receive priority over the case in which the petition is
filed; and (c) other relevant circumstances including why other associated counsel cannot
either prepare the brief for filing or, in the alternative, relieve the movant's counsel of the
other litigation claimed as a ground for extension.
(2) The matter under appeal is so complex that an adequate brief cannot reason-
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the brief is due. The court noted that it maintains the power under
FRAP 46 to fine and suspend lawyers for failure to comply with the
rules of the court. The court imposed no sanctions and allowed the
filing of the brief instanter but cautioned, "[wje do not take lightly the
violation of our rules and having now made clear our view of such
violations we shall have no hesitation in the future in imposing heavy
disciplinary sanctions on violators."'
38
ATTORNEYS' FEES
Issues concerning court awarded attorneys' fees have become the
subject of much litigation in recent years. Last term, the Seventh Cir-
cuit decided several important cases in this area.
The court rendered two decisions which indicate a reluctance to
approve large multipliers 39 to fees which include an hourly rate that
ably be prepared by the date the brief is due, provided that the complexity is factually
demonstrated in the affidavit.
(3) Extreme hardship to counsel will result unless an extension is granted, in which
event the nature of the hardship must be set forth in detail.
The motion shall be filed at least five days before the brief is due, unless it is made
to appear in the motion that the facts which are the basis of the motion did not exist
earlier or were not, or with due diligence could not have been, known earlier to the
movant's counsel. Notice of the fact that an extension will be sought must be given to
the opposing counsel together with a copy of the motion prior to the filing thereof.
In criminal cases, or in other cases in which a party may be in custody (including
military service), a statement must be set forth in the affidavit as to the custodial status of
the party, including the conditions of the party's bail, if any.
(b) Failure ofAppellant to File Brief. When an appellant's original brief is not filed
when it is due, the procedure shall be as follows:
(1) Retained Counsel. If counsel for the appellant is retained, the clerk shall enter
an order directing counsel to show cause within 14 days why the appeal should not be
dismissed. If the delay is not satisfactorily explained within that time and excused by the
court, the appeal will be dismissed for want of prosecution.
(2) Court-Appointed Counsel. If counsel for the appellant is court-appointed, the
appeal shall not be dismissed, but the clerk shall enter an order directing counsel to show
cause within 14 days why disciplinary action should not be taken. After 14 days, the
court will take appropriate action.
(3) Appellant Not Represented by Counsel. If the appellant is acting pro se, the
clerk shall enter an order directing the appellant to show cause within 14 days why the
appeal should not be dismissed. After the 14 days, the court will take appropriate action.
(c) Failure of Appellee to File Brief. When an appellee's brief is not filed on time,
the clerk shall enter an order requiring the appellee to show cause within 14 days why
the case should not be treated as ready for oral argument and submission, and the appel-
lee denied oral argument. After the 14 day period, the court will take appropriate action.
138. 701 F.2d at 62.
139. A multipler is the amount by which a court may increase a base attorneys' fee award
which is known as a "lodestar". The lodestar is arrived at by multiplying the hours expended
times a reasonable hourly rate determined by the court. Thus, if a lawyer spends 100 hours on a
case and a reasonable fee for his time is $100 per hour, the lodestar for that case is $10,000. The
court may increase the amount of the award by applying a multiplier. The factors generally con-
sidered include: the novelty and difficulty of the question involved; the results obtained; time
limitations imposed by the client or circumstances; preclusion of other employment for the lawyer;
experience, reputation and ability of the lawyer and; whether the fee is contingent. See Waters v.
Wisconsin Steel Workers of International Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
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already reflects a lawyer's abilities. In Tidwell v. Schweicker 140 the
court disallowed a multiplier of 1.5 awarded to lawyers representing
plaintiffs in a suit for unlawful seizure of disability benefits by state and
federal authorities. The plaintiffs succeeded in releasing unlawfully
withheld disability benefits and in prohibiting future withholding of
benefits. The district court awarded fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988
and added a multiplier of 1.5 based upon the importance of the result
achieved by the attorneys. 141
The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to the multiplier. The
court noted that the suit was novel when filed but not so different so as
to warrant a multiplier. The court reasoned that the hourly rate used in
computing the award adequately reflected the quality of the legal serv-
ices rendered. Accordingly, the court disallowed the multiplier.
42
Similarly, in In re Illinois Congressional Districts Reapportionment
Cases,143 the Seventh Circuit reduced the multiplier used by the district
court from 3 to 1.2. The case arose from the lawsuit concerning reap-
portionment of the Illinois Congressional voting districts which had
been rendered unconstitutional due to the population shifts reflected in
the 1980 census. Several plaintiffs filed suit against the Illinois State
Board of Elections, the agency charged with administering the elec-
tions. The district court ultimately found in favor of the plaintiffs rep-
resenting the interests of the Democratic party. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988, the court awarded a lodestar of $128,215 and applied a multi-
plier of three. The court justified its application of the multiplier based
on the following factors: (1) the magnitude and complexity of the case;
(2) the excellent quality of work by plaintiff's attorneys; (3) the ad-
vancement of the public interest in ensuring fair congressional repre-
sentation; (4) the contingent fee basis under which plaintiffs lawyers
took the case; and (5) the pursuasiveness of the plaintiffs plan.144
The Seventh Circuit modified the fee award. It agreed with the
district court that a multiplier was appropriate but held that a multi-
plier of three was excessive. 45 The court emphasized that multipliers
denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976). Accordingly, upon considering these factors, a court might apply a
multiplier to increase the award. The final award is reached then by multiplying the lodestar
times the multiplier. Therefore, a 1.5 or 50% multiplier applied to a $10,000 lodestar would yield
a final award of $15,000.
140. 677 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1982).
141. Id at 567.
142. Id at 570.
143. 704 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1983). The author of this article argued this case on behalf of the
appellant.
144. Id at 381-82.
145. Id
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should not be applied liberally and are justified only in significant cases
where the quality of the attorney's work is considerably above aver-
age.' 46 The court stated that notwithstanding the significance of the
case and the exceptional quality of the legal work, it could not approve
an increase from $165 per hour to $495 per hour for the lead attorney.
It reasoned that the lodestar reflected the attorneys' normal hourly
rates and the lawyers suffered no financial penalty from taking the civil
rights case because they received a rate comparable to the rates which
they received in private cases. Further, the court reasoned that a multi-
plier viewed by itself is of little significance. "Its importance is in its
effect on the basic hourly rate, and where that rate is already high, a
multiplier may yield an excessive bonus."' 147
Finally, the court noted that the attorneys conducted the bulk of
the legal work in less than one month's time. It reasoned that the risk
of receiving no fee was much more limited than if the case had contin-
ued for a long time. A major purpose of awarding fees is as an incen-
tive for attorneys to accept cases where the likelihood of payment from
the client may be small. 148 The court reasoned that an incentive is
particularly needed in lengthy cases where the attorney has little likeli-
hood of receiving payment for a long time. "By contrast, there is less
need to provide an additional incentive to compensate for the risk of
undertaking uncertain litigation when the period of risk is small, be-
cause more attorneys are willing to take a case where their financial
exposure is of limited duration."' 149
Both Tidwell and Congressional Districts follow the Seventh Cir-
cuit's consistent position on multipliers. The court has reduced or re-
jected the multiplier in each of the five cases in which it has considered
the appropriateness of a multiplier. 150 The court has never allowed a
146. Id at 384.
147. Id
148. See Coop v. City of South Bend, 635 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1980).
149. 704 F.2d at 384.
150. In Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Electric, Inc., 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979) the court
reduced from 1.5 to 1.25, a multiplier based on the contingent fee arrangement and excellent
quality of representation in a Title ViI case. Similarly, in Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d
760 (7th Cir. 1982), the court reduced from 1.33 to approximately 1.08, a multiplier based on the
quality of representation in a Title VII case. The court reasoned that the hourly rate already
reflected the quality of counsel.
In Bonner v. Coughlin, 657 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) the court completely elimi-
nated a multipler awarded in a prisoner's rights suit. The court found that the factual issues were
not complex, the case had little precedential value and the attorneys were not precluded from
taking other employment. The court stressed that the contingent nature of a fee alone does not
justify the use of a multiplier.
Interestingly, in reviewing an award of attorney fees, an appellate court is limited to an abuse
of discretion standard of review. Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit has found little difficulty in
reviewing and modifying district court fee awards.
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multiplier greater than 1.25. Thus, the court has sent a clear message
that it will not approve excessive multipliers where the lodestar already
reflects the factors properly considered in awarding fees.'
5 '
The right to attorneys' fees for time spent in establishing such a
right to attorneys' fees was discussed in Muscare v. Quinn.'52 Muscare
involved a suit against the Chicago Fire Department by a fireman who
was suspended without a hearing for refusing to shave his beard. The
plaintiff won reinstatement and backpay, and sought attorney's fees of
$41,000. The district court awarded $25,000 and the plaintiff appealed.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the plaintiff had prevailed
on only one of two claims raised in the district court.1 3 On remand the
district court awarded $8,000. The plaintiff then sought $10,000 for
time spent litigating the original claim for fees, but the district court
refused to award any additional fees.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, recognizing that the plaintiff pre-
vailed on the merits of the underlying litigation and therefore, he could
receive fees for litigating the fee issue notwithstanding the reduction of
his initial request. The court, however, held that the district court
properly exercised its discretion in refusing any additional award under
the circumstances of the case. 15
4
The court emphasized the practical result of reversing and award-
ing a second round of fees. It stated that "the consequence if we should
reverse and remand for an award of additional fees is all too predict-
able: however little the plaintiff is awarded on remand he will move
the district court to award him attorneys' fees for time spent in prose-
cuting this appeal, and if the district court denies his motion he will be
back up here."'155 The court noted that the litigation on the merits took
only two years. In contrast, the fee litigation continued for six years.
The court considered this an apt illustration of why the district court
must ultimately exercise its discretion to end the litigation. As Judge
151. Those factors are fully set forth in Judge Swygert's opinion in Waters v. Wisconsin Steel
Workers of International Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309, 1322 (7th Cir. 1974).
152. 680 F.2d 42 (7th Cir. 1982).
153. See Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1980).
154. 680 F.2d at 45.
155. Id at 44. Judge Posner went on to explain the inevitable result (as only he could):
Every civil rights litigation will be like a nest of Chinese boxes. The outside box is the
litigation of the civil rights issue itself. Within it is the litigation over the fees incurred in
the litigation over the merits-ordinarily a lesser litigation, as our metaphor implies,
though in this case the stakes in each of the two rounds of fee litigation have been
greater, at least in monetary terms, than the stakes in the original civil rights litigation.
Within the initial fee litigation will be another litigation--usually a smaller one, here
again a bigger one--over the attorneys' fees incurred by the plaintiff in the initial fee
litigation. And so on without necessary end.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
Posner stated, "[t]hree appeals in a case about a goatee are enough." 156
Accordingly, the court affirmed. 157
The court discussed the propriety of interim fee awards in yet an-
other chapter of the perpetual case of Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority. 158 The first, rather anomolous, issue discussed was whether
the suit was pending when Congress enacted the Fees Award Act in
1976 for purposes of making plaintiffs eligible to petition for fees under
that Act. The defendants argued that the case was effectively com-
pleted prior to 1976 and that the parties brought the suit without an
expectation of receiving fees. Prior to 1976 no remedial action had
been taken as a result of the suit and the scope of the possible remedy
changed. Thus, the court held that the case was pending in 1976 and
came within the purview of the Fees Act. 159
The defendants also argued that the fee application was untimely.
They argued that attorneys' fees are costs governed by FRCP 54(d),
and that pursuant to Rule 45 of the General Rules of the Northern
District of Illinois, attorneys' fees must be petitioned for within ten
days of the entry of the order giving rise to the fee award. The court
rejected that argument and held that, "[a]bsent a fixed time limitation,
the only constraint on when the plaintiffs file for attorneys' fees under
Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules is laches."' 160 Accordingly, the court
reasoned that the party opposing the fee award must demonstrate un-
due delay and prejudice to the nondelaying party.' 6' The court found
no undue delay because it viewed the case as ongoing, and the fee re-
quest pendente lite. The court found the award caused no prejudice to
the defendants.
The defendants also argued that the court should reduce the
amount of the award because plaintiffs' counsel charged a uniform rate
of $125 for work done during the entire time of the case. The court
refused, reasoning that plaintiffs' attorneys received no fees during an
intensely inflationary period and the defendants had use of their money
156. Id at 45.
157. The court also rejected an argument that the denial of second-round fees would en-
courage defendants to drag out litigation to make the plaintiff's victory on the merits a Pyrrhic
one. The court found this case a poor example, noting that the defense on the merits ultimately
saved the underlying fire department regulation and the defense of the fee claim caused it to be
reduced by 80 percent. Id
158. 690 F.2d 601 (7th Cir.), cert. deniea 103 S. Ct. 2438 (1982).
159. Judge PeU dissented from this aspect of the opinion. He reasoned that more than two-
thirds of the case was completed prior to 1976, and after that date the court really only retained
supervisory jurisdiction for implementation purposes. Id. at 614.
160. Id at 612.
161. Id, citing, Advanced Hydraulics, Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 525 F.2d 477, 479 (7th Cir.
1975).
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throughout that time. Accordingly, the court held that it was appropri-
ate to award the current hourly rate rather than historical rates.
62
Finally, the court rejected the argument that fee awards should be
reduced where they are paid to not-for-profit organizations. Thus, the
court followed the holdings of every other court of appeals that has
considered this question.1
63
The issue of the district court's inherent authority to supervise liti-
gation and fee contracts was discussed in Rosquist v. Sooline Rail-
road164 The fee question arose out of an accident case tried in district
court under diversity jurisdiction. The suit was brought by the hus-
band of a woman who was killed when her automobile was struck by a
train. Her two children were injured seriously and were plaintiffs to
the suit. The plaintiffs agreed to a contingent fee representation con-
tract which provided that the lawyers would receive one-third of the
award in the event they settled or won the case.165
The parties reached an agreement to end the case through a struc-
tured settlement. The settlement provided that the plaintiffs would re-
ceive a small initial sum and periodic payments thereafter. The total
present value of the settlement was approximately $305,000. Further,
the agreement provided that attorneys' fees would be paid separately
by the defendant. The total amount in fees was $250,000 to be paid in
five annual installments of $50,000.166
Judge Grady rejected the settlement, stating that it was unclear
whether the interests of one of the children were adequately protected
by the agreement. Accordingly, the district court appointed a guardian
ad litem to investigate the case and advise the court on the child's
behalf. 167
The case eventually went to trial. The jury awarded plaintiffs a
total of $628,000. Judge Grady entered judgment on the verdict and
ordered the guardian adlitem and plaintiffs' counsel to submit petitions
for fees and expenses. Plaintiffs' lawyers requested $209,333 (one-third
of the total recovery less claimed costs). The district court awarded
$90,950 in fees, somewhat less than 15 percent of the verdict. 68
The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court re-
tained jurisdiction over the fund provided by the defendant's payment
162. 690 F.2d at 612-13.
163. See Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 896-900 (D.C. Cir. 1980) and cases cited therein.
164. 692 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1982).
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of the award until all claims against that fund were settled. The court
found that this was a matter of the district court's equitable
jurisdiction. 
69
Courts often oversee fee issues when a client is unable to fully pro-
tect his own interests. 170 The court noted that the district court retains
inherent authority to supervise members of the bar. It reasoned that in
this case the children could not effectively protect their interests. One
of the children was severely injured, their mother was dead and their
father had effectively abandoned them due to his emotional problems
resulting from mother's death. Accordingly, the court held that Judge
Grady's intervention into the fee question was appropriate.
The court cautioned, however, that this decision does not imply
that courts should sua sponte review every attorneys' fee contract. It
stated that where the parties appear to be competent and freely con-
senting, the fee agreement, "will most often be controlling." 171
The Seventh Circuit held that Judge Grady did not abuse his dis-
cretion in determining the amount of the fee. 172 It applied a reasona-
bleness standard in reviewing the award. The court noted that the
district court properly considered the submitted hours, the complexity
of the case and the skill of counsel. 173
The court then turned to the district court's consideration of the
"customary fee."' 174 Plaintiffs' counsel argued that the one-third ar-
rangement is the usual contract in personal injury cases. The court ac-
knowledged that, but held that it was not error to consider customary
fixed rates in calculating what is reasonable. Thus, it approved the dis-
trict court's method of consideration of the requested fee, in which the
district court divided the fee by the tabulated hours. 175
The court, however, stated that a fixed fee may not be compared
169. Id. at 1110, citing, Cappel v. Adams, 434 F.2d 1278, 1281 (5th Cir. 1970).
170. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Teitelbaum, 475 F.2d 137 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. I I 11
(1973) (seamen); Dunn v. H.K. Porter, 602 F.2d 1105, 1109 (3d Cir. 1979) (parties to a class ac-
tion); Cappel v. Adams, 434 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1970) (children).
171. 692 F.2d at 1111 (emphasis added).
172. Plaintiffs' counsel also argued that Judge Grady should not have decided the fee issue
because he is prejudiced on the subject. They contended that through his writings, lectures and
other judicial pronouncements, Judge Grady exhibited a strong predisposition against contingent
fee agreements. The court rejected that argument. It expressed some doubt as to whether specific
views previously expressed outside of court could disqualify a judge. Further, it held that Judge
Grady's general tenets are not so case-specific that they would predetermine his views and the
outcome in this particular case. Id at 1112.
173. The court noted that the performance of counsel was generally good, but that certain
proof of damages was actually produced through the defendant's case. Further, it noted that
counsel kept no precise hourly records but estimated his time at 257 hours. Id. at 1113.
174. Id at 1114.
175. This method of evaluation yielded $813.57 per hour. Id
CIVIL PROCEDURE
directly to the contingent award without considering the attorney's risk
based on the likelihood of success. 176 Liability and damage appeared
fairly clear cut, and the ability of the defendant to pay was never at
issue. Accordingly, the court held that the resultant $350 per hour al-
lowed by the district court was reasonable.1
77
The Seventh Circuit decided several other attorneys' fee cases
which deserve brief mention. In Larsen v. Sielaff,78 the court held that
a prisoner suit, which is nominally filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but
which provides relief only available in a habeas corpus proceeding,
cannot serve as the basis for a fee request under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
In Sanchez v. Schwartz,179 the court again declined to adopt the
"bright prospects" rule of the Second and Ninth Circuits. The defend-
ants argued that the court should refuse to award fees to counsel in
cases likely to result in substantial monetary awards, because a contin-
gent contract alone should attract competent counsel. 80 The court re-
jected that argument and reiterated its view that a prevailing civil rights
plaintiff is ordinarily entitled to fees as a matter of course.' 8'
The court, however, reduced the fees awarded in Sanchez. It be-
gan by noting that the award of fees is reviewable only for abuse of
discretion. 82 Nevertheless, it reduced the $46,000 award by $9,200,
reasoning that the district court failed to adequately scrutinize and
make specific factual findings on the petition. The court disallowed
hours it deemed excessive for trial preparation and for preparation of
four amended complaints. Further, the court specifically held that each
side should bear their own costs on appeal and in accordance with
Muscare v. Quinn,'83 no additional fee award would be made.'
8 4
In Pigeaud v. McLaren, 85 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district
court's denial of fees to a civil rights plaintiff whose case was disposed
of pursuant to acceptance of an offer of judgment under Rule 68. The
offer explicitly stated that it would not be construed as an admission of
176. Id
177. Id. at 1115.
178. 702 F.2d 116 (7th Cir.), cert. denied4 104 S. Ct. 372 (1983).
179. 688 F.2d 503 (7th Cir. 1982).
180. The court also refused to hold that where a contingent fee contract is awarded, it serves as
an automatic ceiling on the amount of a statutory award. It found no support for such a rule in
applicable case law or the legislative history. Id at 505.
181. See Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 454 U.S. 897 (1981); Dawson
v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70 (7th Cir. 1979).
182. See Harrington v. Devito, 656 F.2d 264, 269 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 993
(1982).
183. 680 F.2d 42 (7th Cir. 1982).
184. 688 F.2d at 507.
185. 699 F.2d 401 (7th Cir. 1983).
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liability and thus, the plaintiff could not be considered a prevailing
party for purposes of a fee request under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.186 The
court rejected plaintiffs argument that his fees were part of his "costs"
under Rule 68. It held that for an offer of judgment to serve as the
basis of a fee award, it must specifically include language to that
effect. 
87
Finally, in AcCandless v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Com-
pany, 88 the court affirmed a district court's assessment of fees against a
lawyer for bad faith pleading. The plaintiff had filed suit alleging vio-
lations of § 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,89 and
several constitutional provisions, without first complying with the ex-
plicit requirement of exhaustion of internal union remedies. The dis-
trict court dismissed the suit as untimely and frivolous. The defendant
sought fees and costs incurred in the defense of the suit. 190
Judge Aspen awarded $1,000 in fees based on four factors: (1) the
obvious meritlessness of the § 301 claim; (2) failure to provide any fac-
tual or legal support for the constitutional claims; (3) counsel's omis-
sion of a key sentence from a quotation; and (4) failure to respond to
the defendant's motion for fees and costs. 191 In affirming the award,
the Seventh Circuit stated that the case was neither one in which a
lawyer was unable to establish the factual basis of the suit at the time of
filing but reasonably hoped that discovery would reveal it, nor one in
which a lawyer was legitimately urging that prior holdings be reexam-
ined. Accordingly, the court affirmed and doubled the district court's
assessment of fees directly against plaintiffs counsel. 92
These decisions indicate that the Seventh Circuit will closely scru-
tinize awards of attorneys' fees notwithstanding a rather limited stan-
dard of review in such cases. Further, they send a message to the
judges of the district court encouraging them to exercise their inherent
power of supervision of the bar to ensure conformance with the reason-
ableness standard of the Code of Ethics in filing for fees and in entering
fee contracts with clients.
186. Id at 402.
187. Id at 403-04.
188. 697 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1983).
189. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
190. 697 F.2d at 199.
191. Id at 199.
192. Id at 199-200.
